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 Ethnic Cleansing as Euphemism, Metaphor, 
Criminology, and Law 
 John  Hagan and  Todd J.  Haugh 
 I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Euphemistic uses of the concept of ethnic cleansing are often traced to “the burn-
ing tradition” in the Balkans and the “! nal solution” in Nazi Germany. In this 
chapter, we review the origins of these euphemisms and consider how they form 
a backdrop for understanding the further metaphorical in" uence of the imagery 
of ethnic cleansing. Cherif Bassiouni and an international commission of experts 
revealed the incriminating in" uence of ethnic cleansing as an activating metaphor, 
and in this way turned the understanding of the term on its head. 1 The result was to 
spur an international response to the massive and ongoing atrocities in the former 
Yugoslavia. We examine the further evolution of a social scienti! c understanding 
of ethnic cleansing as a topic of criminological study – a topic that is now evolving 
alongside the law of ethnic cleansing and genocide in the current epicenter of mass 
atrocity: Darfur. 
 This discussion requires that we enumerate the meaning and elements of ethnic 
cleansing. In doing so, we adopt a distinction between “atrocity crime” and “atrocity 
law” as advanced by David Scheffer. 2 Accordingly, we distinguish the “criminology 
of mass atrocity” from “the law of atrocity.” The criminology of mass atrocity involves 
the social scienti! c study of the precursors of ethnic cleansing, although it may also 
involve studying factors in" uencing whether and when these crimes will be legally 
prosecuted. Our use of Scheffer’s distinction is less to advance the prosecution of 
ethnic cleansing than to increase the possibility for “real time” criminological doc-
umentation and analysis of acts of ethnic cleansing. These acts, which often extend 
to genocide, demand policy interventions. 
 Our point is that the social scienti! c methods of criminological documentation 
and analysis of acts of ethnic cleansing are important in identifying what Scheffer 
calls the “precursors of genocide.” 3 We argue that such documentation and analysis 
 1   The Secretary-General,  Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 780 to Investigate Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former 
Yugoslavia (1992 ), ¶¶ 129–50, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27, 1994) [hereinafter  Final Report ]. 
 2   David J. Scheffer,  The Future of Atrocity Law , 25  Suffolk Transnat ’ l L. Rev. 389, 398 (2002 ). 
 3   David J. Scheffer,  Genocide and Atrocity Crimes , 1  Genocide Stud. & Prevention 229, 229 
(2006 ). Such precursors might include, for example, the forced migration and large-scale dis-
placement of civilians from their homes and properties. 
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is a necessary ! rst step to timely intervention. Our argument is focused as much 
or more on the prevention of ethnic cleansing and genocide as on its prosecution 
and punishment. Our conclusion is ultimately a call for a criminology of ethnic 
cleansing that will make the prospect of prosecuting mass atrocities less paralytic 
and more timely. We illustrate our argument by drawing on the events in the former 
Yugoslavia and Darfur. 
 II.  ETHNIC CLEANSING AS EUPHEMISM 
 The history of mass atrocity is awash with euphemistic rationalizations. For exam-
ple, authoritative accounts of the “burning tradition” in the Balkans, which include 
euphemistic references to ethnic cleansing, appear in the ! ndings of an interna-
tional observer mission sent by the American Carnegie Endowment to report on the 
Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. 4 Further reports of “cleansing” in the Balkans date 
back to at least the early 1800s. 
 In his history of the Serbs, Tim Judah writes that “Vuk Karadžić makes use of the 
word ‘cleansed’ in describing what happened to the Turks of Belgrade … in 1806.” 5 
He also observes that:
 [t]here was no question of this being an act of undesirable discrimination; it was 
simply accepted as normal for the time and place. How widespread was the massa-
cre of the Muslims during the insurrection is unclear, yet there was no doubt that 
such a practice was deemed a laudable aim worth singing about. 6 
 The Carnegie Endowment similarly reported that “[t]he burning of villages and the 
exodus of the defeated population is a normal and traditional incident of … all these 
peoples. What they have suffered themselves, they in" ict in turn upon others.” 7 The 
euphemistic use of the term “cleansing” was thus joined with the idea that the atroc-
ities involved were not only acceptable but desirable. References to the burning 
tradition and cleansing of the population treated acts such as killing one’s neighbor 
and burning his village as expected means to the valued end of national libera-
tion. These practices were rationalized again throughout the 1990s in the former 
Yugoslavia as necessary steps toward achieving a “Greater Serbia.” 
 The “! nal solution” was a euphemism for the Holocaust in Nazi Germany. This 
extensive linguistic subterfuge also included references to cleansing. In the preface 
to  Documents of the Persecution of the Dutch Jewry, 1940–1945 , it was remarked that 
“these men spoke not of … ‘gassing’ but of ‘sonderbehandlung’ (special treatment).” 8 
 4   Carnegie Endowment for Int ’ l Peace ,  Report of the International Commission to 
Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of Balkan Wars 73 (1914). 
 5   Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia 75 (1997). 
 6   Id . 
 7   Carnegie Endowment for Int ’ l Peace ,  supra note 4, at 73. 
 8   Jacob Presser,  Preface to  Documents of the Persecution of the Dutch Jewry 1940 – 1945 , 
at 10 (1969). 
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The of! cial German memorandum outlining the ! nal solution indicated that “this 
discussion had been called for the purpose of clarifying fundamental questions.” 9 
The memorandum went on to describe “the aim of all this being that of clearing 
the German Lebensraum of Jews in a legal manner,” 10 and that “in the course of the 
practical execution of the ! nal settlement of the problem, Europe will be cleaned 
up from the west to the east.” 11 
 The challenge was to expose this euphemistic use of language for what it was – a 
label for organized acts of violent death and displacement – and turn it into a source 
of evidence for the elimination of violence as accepted practice. 
 III.  ETHNIC CLEANSING AS METAPHOR 
 The metaphorical meaning of ethnic cleansing was captured by Mao Zedong’s 
observation that insurgents among a civilian population are like ! sh swimming in 
water that must be drained to eliminate the ! sh. 12 As recently as the Darfur con" ict, 
one Sudanese ministerial of! cial, Ahmad Harun, made a strikingly similar state-
ment. 13 According to the ICC Prosecutor who indicted Harun for war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, Harun stated that “rebels in! ltrate the villages” and that 
the villages “are like water to ! sh.” 14 The ICC Prosecutor noted that “[t]his propo-
sition – that the potential rebel habitats or communities were as dangerous as the 
rebels – tellingly differed little from his [Harun’s] statements that ‘all the Fur,’ or 
3/4 of the population of Darfur, should be regarded as the target of the counter-
insurgency campaign.” 15 This exempli! es the sweeping metaphorical logic of the 
concept of ethnic cleansing. 
 Cherif Bassiouni seized the opportunity to change the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
from a rationalizing euphemism into an incriminating metaphor when he pre-
pared the ! nal report on violations of international humanitarian law in the former 
Yugoslavia. 16 The most incriminating part of Bassiouni’s report for the International 
 9   Protocol of the Conference Held in Berlin on January 20, 1942, where measures were discussed 
for “Endlosung der Judenfrage,” the Liquidation of the Jews (1942)  in  Documents of the 
Persecution of the Dutch Jewry 1940 – 1945 , at 29 (1969). 
 10   Id . 
 11   Id . at 30. 
 12   Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare 92–93 (Samuel B. Grif! th, II trans., Univ. of Ill. Press 
2000) (1937). 
 13   Harun was charged with ! fty-one counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes by the 
International Criminal Court. A warrant for his arrest was issued on April 27, 2007.  See  Office of 
the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, The Situation in Darfur, Fact Sheet 
(Feb. 27, 2007); Prosecutor v. Harun, Case No. ICC-02/05–01/07, Warrant for Arrest of Ahmad 
Harun (Apr. 27, 2007). 
 14   Situation in Darfur, The Sudan, Case No. ICC-02/05–56, Prosecutor’s Application Under Article 
58(7), ¶ 147 (Feb. 27, 2007). 
 15   Id . ¶ 148. 
 16   Final Report, supra note 1, ¶¶ 129–50;  The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing , Annex IV, U.N. Doc. 
S/1994/674/Add.2 (Dec. 28, 1994). 
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Commission of Experts established by the United Nations’ Security Council was 
based on 131 single-spaced pages of documentation and analysis regarding the 
events in Prijedor (the “Prijedor report”). 17 The Prijedor report was prepared by 
Hanne Sophie Greve and Morten Bergsmo, who joined extensive background mate-
rials with nearly 400 interviews of victims and witnesses to the events in Prijedor. 18 
Names were often redacted from the report for purposes of con! dentiality, but full 
statements were separately collected into four large volumes. These volumes were 
later transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and used to guide investigations and prosecutions. 
 The Prijedor report argued that the facts on the ground met the elements of the 
crime of genocide. 19 Since Greve and Bergsmo believed the events were genocide, 
and since the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ was only then beginning to enter public dis-
course, they did not use this term in the report. However, when Bassiouni prepared 
the ! nal report of the Commission, he included a series of introductory paragraphs 
that explained how, in the context of the former Yugoslavia, the term ‘ethnic cleans-
ing’ was widely understood to refer to the use of force and intimidation to render an 
area ethnically homogeneous by removing persons of other groups. 20 
 Bassiouni further explained that the policy of ethnic cleansing was linked to polit-
ical doctrines involving “Greater Serbia” and claims that date as far back as the 1389 
battle in Kosovo. 21 His explanation thus began to turn the rationalizing euphemism 
of ethnic cleansing, which was widely known and endorsed among Serbian military 
and political leaders, into an incriminating metaphor that social scientists could rec-
ognize as a collective framing device. 22 In this context, ethnic cleansing was a way 
of framing an arc-like geography of aggression that began by linking Serbia proper 
with Serb-inhabited areas of Croatia and Bosnia, leading to the semicircular sweep of 
Kosovo, sometimes called Operation Horseshoe. 23 Although the Prijedor report could 
not fully tell this still unfolding story, Bassiouni emphasized in the Final Report of the 
Commission that the pattern documented in Prijedor closely matched similar infor-
mation received in other regions, including Banja-Luka, Brčko, Zvornik, and Foca. 24 
 17   Final Report, Prijedor Report , Annex V, U.N. Soc. S/1994/672/Add.2 (Dec. 28, 1994) [hereinafter 
 Prijedor Report ]. 
 18   Id . ¶¶ 1, 37–40. 
 19   Final Report ,  supra note 1, ¶ 182;  Prijedor Report ,  supra note 17, ¶ 35. 
 20   Final Report ,  supra note 1, ¶¶ 129–50. 
 21   Id . ¶ 131. Bassiouni noted that Serbian contemporary reality was particularly affected by a vivid 
recollection of history, even events taking place as far back as the 1300s. 
 22   Robert D. Bedford & David A. Snow,  Framing Process and Social Movements: An Overview and 
Assessment , 26  Ann. Rev. Soc . 611 (2000). A framing device is a cognitive structure, usually con-
sisting of a word or phrase that connects events, people, and groups into a meaningful narrative 
that communicates an understanding of an aspect of the social world to others. 
 23   Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond 122 (2000). Operation Horseshoe was 
developed in autumn 1998 and authorized by Milošević in early 1999. Part of the Serbian “master 
plan,” it called for a sweep of Kosovo by army and paramilitary groups that drove most of the pop-
ulation into Albania and Macedonia by late March. 
 24   Final Report ,  supra note 1, ¶ 140. 
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 Neither the Prijedor Report nor the Commission Report was presented as social 
science evidence. Indeed, the Reports’ goal was to provide a legalistic presentation 
of the facts. Yet crucial social facts were included, setting a social science foundation 
for the claim that the atrocity crime of ethnic cleansing had been committed. For 
example, the Prijedor report analyzed Serbian-reported census counts, establish-
ing that between 1991 and 1993, the Muslim population in the region decreased 
from 49,454 to 6,124, whereas the Serbian population increased from 47,745 to 
53,637. 25 
 When the Prijedor team completed its report detailing the ethnic cleansing of the 
region, its members had no doubt about its legal meaning: “It is unquestionable that 
the events in Opština Prijedor since 30 April 1992 qualify as crimes against human-
ity. Furthermore, it is likely to be con! rmed in court under due process of law that 
these events constitute genocide.” 26 Yet it was the metaphorical framing of the events 
in Prijedor as ethnic cleansing that persuasively summarized what happened there. 
 The ethnic cleansing that occurred in Prijedor was not consistently denied by 
Serbian authorities. The concept of cleansing was a well-known part of Serbian 
culture, and its consequences were con! rmed by the of! cial Serbian census statis-
tics. A chilling con! rmation that the concept of ethnic cleansing had fully circu-
lated through Serbian leadership circles was provided by the journalist John Burns, 
who reported an interview with a Serbian commander Borislav Herak. In the inter-
view, Herak con! rmed that “Serbian commanders called the Serbian operation … 
 ‘ciscenje prostora,’ or the cleansing of the region, and had told the Serbian ! ghters 
to leave nobody alive.” 27 
 Bassiouni succeeded in transforming the previously euphemistic use of the con-
cept of ethnic cleansing, and its role in rationalizing death and displacement, into 
a powerful metaphor that locally framed genocidal crimes in Prijedor and more 
widely in Bosnia and Croatia. 
 IV.  THE MEANINGS OF ETHNIC CLEANSING 
 Ethnic cleansing is generally understood as the systematic removal of a group or 
groups from an area by killing, expulsion, and/or imprisonment. A crucial con-
cern is that the cleansing of ethnic groups is policy-driven. As Andrew Bell-Fialkoff 
explains, “ethnic cleansing can be understood as the expulsion of an ‘undesirable’ 
population from a given territory due to religious or ethnic discrimination, political, 
strategic or ideological considerations, or a combination of these.” 28 
 Although the UN General Assembly has identi! ed ethnic cleansing as a viola-
tion of international humanitarian law and explicitly declared that “the abhorrent 
 25   Id . ¶ 153. 
 26   Id . ¶ 182;  Prijedor Report ,  supra note 17, ¶ 35. 
 27   John F. Burns,  A Killer’s Tale – Special Report: A Serbian Fighter’s Path of Brutality ,  N.Y. Times , 
Nov. 27, 1992, at A1. 
 28   Andrew Bell-Fialkoff,  A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing ,  Foreign Aff ., Summer 1993, at 110. 
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policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’ … is a form of genocide,” 29 the concept is better under-
stood as overlapping with and extending beyond genocide. For example, in the trial 
of Milomir Stakić on charges of genocide in Prijedor, the ICTY Trial Chamber 
observed that despite obvious similarities between genocidal and ethnic cleansing 
policies, a “clear distinction must be drawn between physical destruction and mere 
dissolution of a group. The expulsion of a group or part of a group does not in itself 
suf! ce for genocide.” 30 
 To be genocide, ethnic cleansing must be intentional and fall within one of the 
categories of acts of group or partial group destruction explicitly prohibited by the 
Genocide Convention. The genocidal activity most likely to occur in situations of 
ethnic cleansing is the “deliberate[] in" icti[on] on the group conditions of life cal-
culated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.” 31 Of course, the 
imprecise reference to whole or partial destruction is an issue for consideration. The 
precise and intended targeting of a group for ethnic cleansing may also be unclear. 
As a result, some ethnic cleansing more easily ! ts within the meaning of crimes 
against humanity, as a “widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population.” 32 
 Dražen Petrović further categorizes types of conduct recognized as component 
parts of ethnic cleansing. These categories include: (1) administrative measures, 
such as removal from employment and elected positions, and interference with 
mobility and access to essential goods and services; (2) other nonviolent measures, 
such as threatening media attention and harassment and related forms of intimida-
tion; (3) terrorizing measures, such as deportation, detention, discrimination, and 
displacement, which are usually illegal, threatening, and harmful; and (4) military 
measures, such as attacking and laying siege to a locality, and detaining, deporting, 
and executing leaders and citizens. 33 However, Petrović emphasizes that all of these 
measures and more can also be treated as isolated violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law while overlooking or underemphasizing their systematic and col-
lective structure, which is a distinctive characteristic of ethnic cleansing. 34 
 To capture the systematic and collective aspect of ethnic cleansing, which he 
regards as central, Petrović urges particular attention be paid to the goals of cleans-
ing acts. He also draws attention to the motivating policies of the involved parties, 
 29   The Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina , G.A. Res. 47/121, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/121 
(Dec. 18, 1992). 
 30   Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97–24-T, Judgment, ¶ 519 (July 31, 2003). 
 31   Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide , art. 2, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 
Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter  Genocide Convention ];  Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court , Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, art. 6, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 [hereinafter  Rome Statute ]. 
 32   Rome Statute ,  supra note 31, art. 7. 
 33   Dražen Petrović,  Ethnic Cleansing – An Attempt at Methodology , 5  Eur. J. Int ’ l L . 342, 345–48 
(1994). 
 34   Id . at 348. 
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both in the form of organized attacks and counterattacks. Petrović’s understanding 
is that:
 [E]thnic cleansing is a well-de! ned policy of a particular group of persons to sys-
tematically eliminate another group from a given territory on the basis of reli-
gious, ethnic or national origin. Such a policy involves violence and is very often 
connected to military operations. It is to be achieved by all possible means, from 
discrimination to extermination, and entails violations of human rights and inter-
national humanitarian law. 35 
 Petrovic ́ is clearly correct that the “systematic elimination” aspect of ethnic cleans-
ing is central to its overlap with genocide, but also involves a potential extension 
beyond the meaning of genocide. We argue that establishing whether “systematic 
elimination” is present involves using a mixture of social scienti! c criminological 
and legal evidence, with the criminological evidence often playing a leading role. 
 Petrovic ́ identi! es several forms of evidence of systematic elimination that depend 
on intent. 36 The degree of intent present bears on the overlapping meanings of eth-
nic cleansing and genocide. 37 Petrović acknowledges the rarity of ! nding explicit 
written materials and public statements of of! cial intentions. 38 This kind of material 
is especially dif! cult to uncover in “real time,” since it is often hidden from public 
view. 
 In a vivid illustration of the complex problems involved in obtaining and introduc-
ing explicit evidence of speci! c intent, the ICTY Trial Chamber ultimately could 
not accept into evidence a recorded audio intercept of General Radislav Krstić issu-
ing a command in Srebrenica to “kill them all.” 39 The rejection of this evidence 
occurred even though the intercept was repeatedly heard in court and subjected to 
extensive expert testimony. 40 This experience highlights important issues of what 
will be deemed “suf! cient evidence” of genocidal intent. We maintain that social 
science documentation and criminological analysis, in addition to legal evidence, 
can occupy a crucial space between what we have followed Scheffer in calling the 
criminology of mass atrocity, as distinct from mass atrocity law. 
 Petrovic ́ identi! es two probative indicators of genocidal intent that he regards 
as constituting “suf! cient evidence.” The ! rst is the participation of government 
authorities in atrocities or their omission to prevent or punish the perpetration 
 35   Id . at 351. 
 36   Id . at 357–58. 
 37   Petrović,  supra note 33, at 357–58. 
 38   Id . at 357. 
 39   John Hagan, Justice in the Balkans: Prosecuting War Crimes in the Hague Tribunal 
169–73 (William O’Bar & John M. Conley eds., 2003). 
 40   Id . The audio intercept was ultimately rejected based on foundation grounds. Although the 
recording was played in court, its poor quality led to battle of experts whether Krstic ́ was one of 
the speakers. In addition, the court found it problematic that the prosecution did not introduce the 
recording until its rebuttal case, even though it was available prior to Krstić’s cross-examination. 
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of these crimes. 41 The second is the identi! cation of civilian groups rather than mil-
itary forces as targets of war. 42 
 Petrovic ́ also identi! es more speci! c evidence of circumstances indicating ethnic 
cleansing and genocide:
 These elements could be: a pro! le of the population killed (sex, age, social posi-
tion, speci! c categories, level of education, etc.), characteristics of individual 
crimes committed (brutality, cruelty, humiliation, etc.), the systematic nature of 
certain crimes (rape, destruction of property and objects necessary for survival of 
population, destruction of places of worship, prevention of delivery of humanitar-
ian aid, etc.). 43 
 Courts will ultimately decide which kinds and combinations of the above evidence 
revealed in the criminology of mass atrocity are crucial to the atrocity law of geno-
cide and ethnic cleansing. 
 First, however, evidence of the above elements necessary for assessing intent must 
be documented and analyzed. Building on Scheffer’s distinction, the range of possi-
bilities involved in this determination opens up important space and motivation for 
criminological documentation and analysis of atrocity crimes – that is, a criminol-
ogy of mass atrocities that can form the foundation for atrocity law determinations. 
We elaborate and illustrate this point next by reviewing the analyses of episodes of 
ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and Darfur. 
 V.  THE KOSOVO PHASE OF THE MILOŠEVIC ́ TRIAL 
 The early phase of the trial of Slobodan Milošević at the ICTY provides a vivid 
example of how the combined use of social scienti! c criminological documentation 
and analysis and more conventional eyewitness evidence may identify the necessary 
intent to establish the “precursors of genocide.” 44 Even earlier availability of such 
evidence, in the manner we follow Scheffer in advocating, might arguably have 
more successfully forestalled the mass atrocities that took place in Kosovo. 
 The ! rst phase of the Milošević trial included the testimony of Patrick Ball, a 
young sociologist and statistician. Ball presented results from a statistical study that, 
at one point, involved him retrieving data on displaced refugees through a barrage 
of gun! re at a Kosovo border crossing. 45 His testimony was introduced to refute 
Milošević’s defense that NATO bombings and attacks by the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA) were actually to blame for the exodus of refugees from Kosovo. 
 Ball was able to identify 4,400 persons killed in Kosovo. 46 He then used popu-
lation sampling methods to estimate that the death toll in Kosovo was more than 
 41   Petrović,  supra note 33, at 357. 
 42   Id . at 358. 
 43   Id . 
 44   Scheffer,  supra note 3, at 229. 
 45   Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02–54-T, Trial Transcript, 2146 (Mar. 13, 2002). 
 46   Id . at 2165. 
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10,000. 47 Ball presented evidence that the geographic and temporal distribution of 
the dead across Kosovo corresponded closely to refugee movements. He concluded 
that the deaths and the refugee movements were the result of a common cause. 48 
 The Milošević defense claimed the deaths and refugee movements were the 
joint products of NATO bombing and KLA terrorism. Yet Ball was able to show 
that surges in refugee " ows followed Serbian military activity; that NATO bombing 
and KLA activity followed, rather than preceded, Serbian military activity; and that 
NATO and KLA actions followed increases in refugee movements. Ball testi! ed that 
“the ! ndings of this study are consistent with the hypothesis that action by Yugoslav 
forces was the cause of the killings and refugee " ow.” 49 Milošević characteristically 
responded during cross-examination that “statistics … can prove anything … and 
this is done to serve the purposes of the American politics aimed at enslavement.” 50 
He then turned, in a somewhat less  ad hominem fashion, to the speci! cs of Ball’s 
analysis. 
 Milošević questioned how Ball’s analysis could transform the 4,211 dead into “the 
invented ! gure of 10,356” and then distribute them across time and place. 51 When 
Ball identi! ed the statistical procedures involved, Miloševic ́ responded, “[s]o you 
distributed the assumed dead into assumed time points by applying some kind of sta-
tistical methods. How can that be a serious way of doing it? Tell me.” 52 Ball explained 
that he and his colleagues used accepted methods to compensate for the missing 
data, and included cautionary warnings wherever noteworthy doubts emerged. 53 
 Milošević accused Ball of simplifying war with statistics. 54 Milošević asserted that 
if the Tribunal took seriously Ball’s hypothesis that Yugoslav forces provoked the exo-
dus from Kosovo, then there must be some still unproven of! cial plan. 55 This was a 
demand for very speci! c and explicit evidence of intent. As we note earlier, this type 
of evidence is seldom uncovered. The refusal of of! cials in Belgrade to allow access 
to Yugoslav military archives made such evidence of speci! c intent very unlikely. 
Milošević persisted: “So I’m asking you: if the Yugoslav authorities planned and 
carried out a centrally organized campaign, where is the plan? What is it called and 
who made it?” 56 
 When Ball stuck to his hypothesis-driven analysis of the patterns revealed in the 
data on death, displacement, NATO bombing, and KLA attacks, Milošević pressed 
his contention that there was no credible documentary evidence of an of! cial gov-
ernment plan. He followed with the observation that “you are aware of the statement 
 47   Id . at 2166. 
 48   Id . at 2204. 
 49   Id . 
 50   Id . at 2216. 
 51   Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02–54-T, Trial Transcript, 2226 (Mar. 14, 2002). 
 52   Id . at 2252. 
 53   Id . at 2252–53. 
 54   Id . at 2268. 
 55   Id . 
 56   Id . at 2285. 
9780521116480c08_p177-201.indd   185 12/7/2010   10:38:47 AM
John Hagan and Todd J. Haugh186
of one of the NATO Defense Ministers, the German Minister, Rudolph Scharping, 
who said that there was a plan, the Horseshoe Operation, and this claim was later 
refuted … Are you aware of that?” 57 The Presiding Judge, Richard May, said that 
Operation Horseshoe was neither within Ball’s expertise, nor part of his testimony. 58 
Ball had established a prima facie case based on statistical patterns suggesting the 
deadly role of the Yugoslav forces, but it was also clear that Milošević had raised the 
issue of speci! c intent in a challenging way. 
 The Prosecution followed Ball’s presentation of the statistical evidence with a 
form of eyewitness evidence. The evidence was introduced through the testimony 
of Paddy Ashdown, a former member of the British Parliament who played several 
diplomatic and administrative roles in the Balkan con" ict. 59 Ashdown’s involvement 
exempli! es Scheffer’s discussion of the “precursors of genocide.” 
 Ashdown visited the Balkans in June 1998 in an effort to observe what was then 
unfolding in “real time” in Kosovo. 60 Although he was denied entry to Kosovo itself, 
Ashdown, positioned on the Albanian side of the border, used binoculars to wit-
ness gun! re and the torching of Kosovar villages. 61 This was an indication of “the 
burning tradition” of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. After reporting his observa-
tions to British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Ashdown returned to western Kosovo in 
September 1998. 62 Ashdown witnessed ! rsthand the burning and bombardment of 
whole villages – scenes that were captured on video. 63 
 Ashdown traveled to Belgrade to meet with Milošević in person. Ashdown described 
during the trial what he said to the Serbian leader. He told Milošević that:
 [W]hat I had witnessed could only be described as the actions of the main battle 
units of the Yugoslav army in an action which could only be described as indiscrim-
inate, punitive, designed to drive innocent civilians out of their properties, could 
not be explained by any targeting military operation, that this was … not only ille-
gal under international law, damaging to the representation of the Serbs and his 
nation, but also deeply counter-productive. 64 
 Ashdown further reported warning Milošević that “the international community will 
act if you do not stop.” 65 When Milošević initiated his cross-examination of Ashdown 
in court, Ashdown took the opportunity to again remind Milošević of what was said.
 I said to you, in speci! c terms, that if you went on acting in this fashion, you would 
make it inevitable that the international community would have to act, and in the 
 57   Id . at 2285. 
 58   Miloševic ́ ,  supra note 51, at 2285. 
 59   Id . at 2332. 
 60   Id . at 2336. 
 61   Id . at 2341–44. 
 62   Miloševic ́ ,  supra note 51, at 2346–47. 
 63   Id . at 2354–55; Prosecutor v. Miloševic ́, Case No. IT-02–54-T, Trial Transcript, 2358 (Mar. 15, 
2002). 
 64   Miloševic ́ ,  supra note 63, at 2379. 
 65   Id . at 2384. 
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end they did have to act. And I warned you that if you took those steps and went on 
doing this, you would end up in this Court, and here you are. 66 
 Ashdown was later asked a question from one of the judges about his sense of what 
knowledge Miloševic ́ had of the atrocities occurring in Kosovo. Ashdown stated:
 I must presume that he [Milošević] knew about it, but I wanted to make explic-
itly clear that from the moment I had informed him and had drawn his atten-
tion to the provisions of international law, the Geneva Convention, from that 
moment onwards, he could not then deny knowledge of these facts if they were 
to continue. 67 
 Similar testimony was offered by William Walker, the U.S. Ambassador and head 
of the Kosovo Veri! cation Mission, and by Klaus Naumann, the German NATO 
military commander. 
 Patrick Ball’s statistical analysis and Paddy Ashdown’s eyewitness testimony con-
stitute evidence of Scheffer’s “precursors of genocide.” Ball’s analysis and Ashdown’s 
testimony, as they unfolded during the trial, also illustrate what Scheffer calls atroc-
ity law. Scheffer’s further point is that by opening up a recognized and accepted 
space between the ! nding of evidence of atrocity crime and the unfolding of atroc-
ity law, we can encourage the “real time” collection of evidence of the precursors of 
genocide in an even more proactive manner than this ICTY example provides. For 
example, if Ball’s social scienti! c criminological analysis had been completed even 
earlier, in time for presentation not only to Milošević during Ashdown’s Belgrade 
confrontation, but also at a court hearing of the evidence, it is possible that the 
atrocities in Kosovo might have been more effectively forestalled. This could con-
ceivably have taken place in “real time,” as the events were happening, and in 
advance of the retrospective unfolding of the earlier described atrocity law at the 
ICTY trial. 
 VI.  PRECURSORS OF GENOCIDE AND THE ETHNIC 
CLEANSING OF DARFUR 
 Ethnic cleansing, if not genocide, is still ongoing in Darfur. 68 This presents a timely 
opportunity to see how a social scienti! c criminological approach to mass atroc-
ity can set a persuasive foundation for intervention and legal prosecution. We pre-
sent our own research on Darfur, which builds on earlier work of the U.S. State 
Department. 
 We conceive the genocide charge in Darfur to be as follows: The government 
of Sudan knowingly mobilized and collectivized a racially constructed division 
 66   Id . at 2395. 
 67   Id . at 2497. 
 68   Prosecutor v. Harun, Case No. ICC-02/05–01/07, Warrant for Arrest of Ahmad Harun (Apr. 27, 
2007) (charging ! fty-one counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes, including what could 
be characterized as the systematic murder of the civilian Fur population in Kadoom villages). 
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between the Arab and black African groups in Darfur to intentionally bring about 
the death, destruction, and displacement of those black African groups. Although 
documentary evidence is thus far scarce, we will infer from the statistical evidence 
below that there was authorization from the highest levels of the Sudanese gov-
ernment, as indicated in  Figure 8.1 , for coordinated, racially targeted attacks on 
African farms and villages by Government of Sudan (GoS) military forces and Arab 
Janjaweed militias. As one refugee in the survey described below reported, “they 
come together, they ! ght together, and they leave together.” 69 
 The ICC Prosecutor has identi! ed President Omar Al-Bashir, former Deputy 
Minister of Interior Ahmad Harun, and the militia leader Ali Kushayb as joint 
participants in the mass atrocities in Darfur. 70 In addition to these individuals,  Figure 
8.1 identi! es three other militia leaders who participated in mass atrocities in con-
nection with Deputy Minister Harun. This “chain of command” comes from the 
 69   John Hagan & Wenona Rymond-Richmond, Darfur and the Crime of Genocide 116 
(2009) (quoting  Sudan: Peace But at What Price?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Foreign 
Relations , 108th Cong. 52–62 (2004) (statement of Julie Flint, Darfur ! eld researcher, Human 
Rights Watch). 
 70   Id . at 105, 114–15. 
President
Omar al Bashir
Vice President
Ali Osman Taha
Minister of Interior
Abduraheem Mohammed Hussein
Director of Security & Military Intelligence
Salah Abdallah Gosh
Deputy Minister of Interior
“Darfur Security Desk”
Ahmad Harun
GoS Armed Forces
Gaddal
PDF & PPF / Police
State Security Committees
Local Security Committees
Janjaweed / Militia Leaders
Musa Hilal Hamid Dawai Abdullah Mustafa Abu Shineibat Ali Kushayb
Kabkabaya-
Kutum-Karnoi
Terbeba-Arara-
Beida Habila-Foro Burunga
Settlement & Sub-Localities
Mukjar-Bindisi-
Garsila-Deleig
Identified in ICC Prosecutor’s Application
 figure 8.1.  Sudan-Darfur chain of command, 2003–2004. 
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documentation and analysis of a U.S. State Department survey of refugees in Chad, 
which we discuss below. 
 In June 2004, a U.S. of! cial placed the Sudan government on notice that its 
coordinated attacks on villages in Darfur were being observed and recorded with 
satellite and aerial imagery. 71 Although these attacks were at a minimum signs of 
ethnic cleansing, as well as “precursors of genocide,” the of! cial cautioned “that the 
images are not hard evidence until they are corroborated by testimony of witnesses 
on the ground.” 72 Therefore, during the following July and August, the U.S. State 
Department, at the direction of Secretary of State Colin Powell, conducted the 
Atrocities Documentation Survey (ADS). The ADS was a survey of 1,136 refugees 
who witnessed and experienced attacks in Darfur, but were now living in Chad. 73 
 An eight-page summary of the ADS survey, which included a table of descriptive 
statistics and maps, formed the background for Secretary of State Powell’s testimony 
on September 9, 2004 to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stating 
that genocide was occurring in Darfur. 74 This summary report, however, was only 
the ! rst step in the development of a criminology of the mass atrocities that were 
still underway. We report next how we have used the ADS survey to document and 
analyze the mass atrocities of ethnic cleansing in Darfur. The point is to illustrate 
how a criminological analysis of these mass atrocities can set the foundation for the 
development of the atrocity law of Darfur in future prosecutions. 
 The ADS data uniquely and extensively documented victimization during the 
attacks on black African settlements in Darfur. We know of only one other system-
atic study of precamp violence in Darfur, 75 and none that includes sexual violence. 
As part of the ADS survey, refugees were asked, since the beginning of the con-
" ict approximately eighteen months earlier: (1) when, how, and why they had left 
Darfur; and (2) if, when, how, and by whom they, their family, or their fellow villag-
ers were harmed. 76 
 The survey mixed the closed-ended format of health and crime victimization sur-
veys with the semistructured format of legal witness statements. 77 With the State 
Department’s geospatial technology, cartographers, translators, and interviewers’ 
notations, we were able to locate 90 percent of the settlements from which the 
 71   News Release, Monica Amarelo, American Association for Advancement of Science, Using 
Science to Gauge Sudan’s Humanitarian Nightmare, (Oct. 26, 2004),  available at http://www.
aaas.org/news/releases/2004/1026sudan.shtml 
 72   Id . 
 73   Id . 
 74   Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor & Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research, U.S. Dep ’ t of State, Documenting Atrocities in Darfur (2004),  available at 
http://2001–2009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/36028.htm 
 75   Evelyn Deportere et al.,  Violence and Mortality in West Darfur, Sudan (2003–2004): Epidemiological 
Evidence from Four Surveys , 364  Lancet 1315–20 (2004). 
 76   Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor & Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research ,  supra note 74. 
 77   Cyrena Respini-Irwin,  Geointelligence Informs Darfur Policy ,  Geointelligence , Sept./Oct. 
2005, at 18, 19–22;  see also  Hagan & Rymond-Richmond ,  supra note 69, at 170. 
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refugees " ed. 78 In total, 932 of the 1,136 refugees were identi! ed as coming from 
22 settlements, each with 15 or more respondents. 79 We cross-checked and supple-
mented the ADS data by rereading and recoding the extensive narratives recorded 
in the interviews. 80 
 The ADS refugee sample provides a descriptive picture of the results of ethnic 
cleansing in Darfur. About 40 percent of the ADS respondents are male and they 
are on average thirty-seven years old. 81 Female refugees probably outnumber males 
because in Darfur, males are more likely to be killed whereas females are more 
likely to be raped and survive, at least physically. Slightly more than half of the 
Africans in the sample are self-identi! ed as Zaghawa, approximately a quarter are 
Masalit, and about 5 percent each are Fur and Jebal. 82 The largest concentrations of 
the Zaghawa " ed from North Darfur, whereas most of the Masalit and Fur " ed from 
West Darfur, with the Jebal previously concentrated in one town, Seleya, in West 
Darfur. 83 The documentation of the victimized groups is crucial to establishing the 
protected status of the victims of the mass atrocities. 
 Each attack narrative was read and coded to designate the attacking group as 
Janjaweed, Sudanese, or combined Sudanese and Janjaweed forces. About two 
thirds of the attacks were joint Sudanese and Janjaweed operations; nearly a ! fth 
of the attacks involved Sudanese forces acting alone (usually in bombing attacks); 
and about one-tenth involved the Janjaweed alone. 84 The remaining ten percent 
of cases could not be categorized but are used as a comparison group in some of 
our analyses. 85 The documentation of when the attacks included Sudanese military 
forces is crucial to establishing the role of Sudanese government policy in the mass 
atrocities. 
 During the second two-week period of the ADS interviews, a question was added 
asking if there were rebels actually staying in the respondent’s town or village. 86 
Less than two percent of the respondents in the sample reported a rebel presence. 87 
These reports were disproportionately located in several northern settlements, such 
as Karnoi, near Tine, and Girgira, with the reporting of rebel presence still low, but 
ranging from six to thirteen percent. 88 The documentation of rebel involvement 
in the settlements that were attacked is crucial to refuting the Sudanese govern-
ment’s defense that it was acting in proportionate self-defense against an organized 
insurgency. 
 78   Id . at 22–24. 
 79   Id . at 20. 
 80   Hagan & Rymond-Richmond ,  supra note 69, at 93. 
 81   Id . at 173. 
 82   Id . 
 83   Id . 
 84   Hagan & Rymond-Richmond ,  supra note 69, at 173. 
 85   Id . 
 86   Id . 
 87   Id . 
 88   Hagan & Rymond-Richmond ,  supra note 69, at 173. 
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 There were two waves of attacks in Darfur, and these predictably corresponded 
with the peak periods of ethnic cleansing involving violent and health-related death 
and displacement. About a quarter of the sample " ed during the ! rst three months 
of ! rst wave attacks, about half " ed during the four months of the second wave of 
attacks, with the remaining quarter " eeing during the other thirteen months. 89 The 
second wave of attacks was obviously the most costly in terms of the physical destruc-
tion of the group conditions of social life for Africans in Darfur. It was during the 
second wave of attacks, in December 2003, that Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir 
vowed to “annihilate Darfur rebels.” 90  Figure 8.2 shows monthly death counts from 
January 2003 to September 2004, encompassing the two waves of attacks as well as 
the months before and after. The two sources are the ADS interviews and a sepa-
rate survey based on news and NGO reports of deaths in attacks on 101 villages. 91 
 89   Id . 
 90   Id . at 139–40. 
 91   Id . at 139. 
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The death toll in Darfur for this eighteen-month period is estimated at between 
200,000 and 400,000. 92 
 The ADS interviews are highly detailed in recording the shouting of racial epi-
thets – our measure of racial intent – during the attacks. The epithets are important, 
in part, because they provide evidence of an explicit targeting that focused the attacks 
in a way that went beyond the multiple ethnic tribal identities indigenous to Darfur 
(i.e., the Zaghawa, Fur, and Masalit). The effect of these epithets was to identify an 
explicit binary racial division. As we see next, although both ethnic and racial groups 
are protected under the Genocide Conventions, ethnic attributions are more easily 
dismissed as subjectively and internally adopted by the groups themselves. 
 The UN International Commission of Inquiry approached this distinction involv-
ing subjective and objective identity as an important issue of atrocity law. This is an 
example of how Scheffer argues that the exclusively legal framing of such issues can 
inhibit parties from acting on their responsibility to protect victimized groups. 93 The 
UN Commission concluded that victims of violence in Darfur were not  objectively 
distinct from their attackers and recognizable as  protected ethnic or racial groups 
under the Genocide Convention:
 The various tribes that have been the object of attacks and killings (chie" y the Fur, 
Masalit and Zaghawa tribes) do not appear to make up ethnic groups distinct from 
the ethnic group to which persons or militias that attack them belong. They speak 
the same language (Arabic) and embrace the same religion (Muslim). In addition, 
also due to the high measure of intermarriage, they can hardly be distinguished 
in their outward physical appearance from the members of tribes that allegedly 
attacked them. 94 
 The UN Commission failed to acknowledge that racial distinctions are often socially 
constructed and forcefully imposed with little regard to physical difference. Racial 
epithets are important for both criminological and legal analysis because they cap-
ture the motivation and intent of attackers. The frequently quoted  Akayesu decision 
in Rwanda 95 and the  Jelisić decision in Bosnia 96 both emphasize the importance of 
spoken language in genocide. Social science evidence regarding the in" uence of 
racial epithets is shown below to have an important bearing on the criminology and 
law of mass atrocity in Darfur. 
 We examined the narrative accounts of the attacks on a case-by-case basis to ! nd 
reports of victims and refugees hearing racial epithets. We recorded the content of 
the epithets, detailing as exactly as possible the wording of the epithets, and each 
individual was assigned a code indicating whether or not they heard racial epithets. 
 92   John Hagan & Alberto Palloni,  Death in Darfur ,  Science , Sept. 15, 2006, at 1578–79. 
 93   Scheffer,  supra note 3, at 248. 
 94   U.N. International Commission of Inquiry,  Report of the International Commission on Darfur to 
the United Nations Secretary-General , ¶ 508, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Feb. 1, 2005). 
 95   Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96–4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 698–734 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
 96   Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, Case No. IT-95–10-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 73–77 (Dec. 14, 1999). 
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Respondents reported hearing racial epithets, as indicated on the accompanying 
 Map 8.1 , in all the settlements, with about a quarter to half of the respondents hear-
ing them across the twenty-two settlements. 97 Overall, about one-third of the respon-
dents heard racial epithets during the attacks. 98 These epithets were explicit, often 
invoking images of racial slavery, and they constitute concrete, ! rst-person evidence 
of racial intent. 
 We argue that the racial epithets combine elements of motivation and intent, and 
that they were raised to compelling collective levels in the settings where they were 
most frequently heard. The racial component of the epithets is the motivational 
element. The intent element includes the targeted references to killing, raping, 
assaulting, looting, and destroying group life. 
 97   Hagan & Rymond-Richmond ,  supra note 69, 172–73. 
 98   Id . 
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 Refugees often reported hearing the incoming forces shouting racial slurs, such 
as “this is the last day for blacks,” “[w]e will destroy the black skinned people,” “kill 
all the slaves,” “kill all the blacks,” “you are black, you deserve to be tortured like 
this,” and “we will kill any slaves we ! nd and cut off their heads.” 99 These words and 
phrases shouted by the perpetrators provide insight into and evidence of the attack-
ers’ motivation and intentions during the raids on Darfurian villagers. We shorten 
the reference to “collective racial intent” below, but it is noteworthy that both moti-
vation and intent are involved in the reported racial epithets. 
 In addition to situating the refugees in terms of prior rebel activity in their set-
tlements and the hearing of racial epithets during the attacks, it is also important 
to consider the density of the population settlements in which they lived. The 
more densely settled areas of Darfur are also the most fertile in providing the nec-
essary conditions for group life that are importantly highlighted in the Genocide 
Convention. 100 We developed a measure for density consisting of the number of 
settlements in an area recorded in the UN Humanitarian Information Pro! les (the 
numerator), and the square kilometers in the area (the denominator). 
 Settlement density is more than a measure of the population at risk of victim-
ization. It is also a measure of criminal opportunities and incentives, including 
desirable property consisting of possessions, livestock, and the settled land itself. 
The settlements that score highest on this settlement density measure are in the 
southwestern area of West Darfur, including Bendesi, Foro Burunga, Habiliah, and 
Masteri. Settlement of a land area effectively constitutes ownership in Darfur, and 
in a time of deserti! cation and recurrent famine, access to settled land is often a 
crucial resource for sustaining group life. We hypothesized that the victimization 
characteristic of ethnic cleansing is most likely in the densely settled areas of Darfur, 
where opportunities and incentives for attacks and strains on resources are greatest. 
 This hypothesis is consistent with the Malthusian view of population growth 
previously applied to the Rwandan genocide by Jared Diamond. 101 According to 
Diamond, “population and environmental problems created by non-sustainable 
resource use … ultimately get solved in one way or another: if not by pleasant means 
of our own choice, then by unpleasant and unchosen means, such as the ones that 
Malthus initially envisioned.” 102 Yet Diamond is not an environmental determinist, 
even though he argues that “population pressure was one of the important factors 
behind the Rwandan genocide.” 103 He further allows an important role for ethnic 
hatred, observing that:
 I’m accustomed to thinking of population pressure, human environmental 
impacts, and drought as ultimate causes, which make people chronically desperate 
  99   Id . at 172. 
 100   Rome Statute ,  supra note 31, art. 6. 
 101   Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed 311–28 (2005). 
 102   Id . at 313. 
 103   Id . at 327. 
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and are like the gunpowder inside the powder keg. One also needs a proximate 
cause: a match to light the keg. In most areas of Rwanda, that match was ethnic 
hatred whipped up by politicians cynically concerned with keeping themselves in 
power. 104 
 This last reference to the role of politicians controlling the State and molding what 
we call “collective racial intent” ! ts well with Flint and de Waal’s description of 
a Sudanese security cabal in Khartoum that unleashed the Janjaweed militias on 
black African groups in Darfur as an explicitly planned policy. 105 
 The ! nal pieces of our descriptive portrait of the ADS sample involve its descrip-
tion of genocidal victimization. The classical understanding of genocide emphasizes 
the intentional  taking of lives that characterizes the destruction of a group. We have 
noted that a more contemporary approach to genocide also focuses on the deliber-
ate in" iction of  physical conditions of life on a group calculated to bring about its 
destruction. Obviously both are important and both are included in Article II of the 
original Genocide Convention de! nition. 106 
 Our measurement approach involved using a report section from each survey that 
recorded incidents of victimization. Respondents reported attacks on themselves, 
their families, and their settlements, which involved bombing, killing, rape, abduc-
tion, assault, property destruction, and theft. 107 Each respondent therefore reported 
for him or herself together with his or her settlement. 
 We created a total victimization severity score based on the common law serious-
ness of the incidents reported for attacks on the settlements. We aggregated reports of 
speci! c incidents experienced or witnessed by each respondent in the settlement. 108 
We assigned the following values to the incidents: ! ve to reported killings; four to 
sexual violence or abductions; three to assaults; two to property destruction or theft; 
and one to displacement. 109 
 To illustrate the coding of the incidents in the severity scale, consider the exam-
ple of a thirty-! ve-year-old Masalit woman with a total severity score of ! fty-two. 110 
The attack reported by this woman occurred in a village near Masteri. Sudanese 
government troops and Arab Janjaweed militia attacked her village on September 1, 
2003. Her report included twenty incidents during the attack that occurred that day. 
Her report includes herself, her family, and others in the village. During the attack, 
she was beaten (severity score of 3) and raped (4). Her father was severely beaten 
(3) trying to protect her, and he was subsequently abducted (4). Some women from 
her village were abducted (4) and held for two hours. They were beaten (3) and raped 
 104   Id . at 326. 
 105   Julie Flint & Alex de Waal, Darfur: A Short History of a Long War 101 (2005). 
 106   Genocide Convention ,  supra note 31, art. 2. 
 107   Hagan & Rymond-Richmond ,  supra note 69, at 175. 
 108   Id . at 176. 
 109   Id . 
 110   See also John Hagan & Wenona Rymond-Richmond,  The Collective Dynamics of Genocidal 
Victimization in Darfur , 73  Am. Soc. Rev . 875, 885 (2008). 
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before being released. Another group of women (ages ranging from 16 to 20) were 
raped (4), and she personally witnessed one of the rapes and heard about the rapes 
from other victims. Additional villagers, including her brother, were beaten (3), shot 
(3), and stabbed (3). She witnessed dead bodies (5), all male, some of whom had 
their throats cut, and others that were shot in the head. Her village was completely 
destroyed (2), except for three huts that were on the far edge of the village. Theft 
occurred (2), including that of livestock, food, and water pots. She reports there was 
no rebel activity in or around her village. The only defense the villagers had was a 
few spears, which were no match for the attackers’ guns, knives, aircraft, and pickup 
trucks with mounted guns. She entered Chad in February 2004, becoming one of 
the two to three million Darfurians displaced (1) from the mass atrocities. 
 To the extent that ethnic cleansing and genocide victimization encompass a group 
“in whole” – as, for example, a “scorched earth” policy would imply – there might 
be little within- or between-settlement variation in numbers of deaths or severity of 
victimization of the kind whose quantitative measurement we have just described. 
All would be victimized. On the other hand, to the extent that this group victimi-
zation is “in part,” there should be variance in both within and between settlement 
outcomes. For the criminological and legal reasons we have indicated, we were 
particularly interested in determining the role that racial intent played in explain-
ing variation in Sudanese state organized victimization, along with the Janjaweed 
militias, of the African groups and settlements. 
 Our interest was thus in the settlements as much as the individuals who are the 
victims of the Darfur con" ict as represented in the ADS sample. The hypothetical 
process examined in our analysis is expressed in  Figure 8.3 . We analyze the com-
bined roles of GoS forces with Janjaweed militias in racially targeted mass atrocities, 
as well as in the selective protection of nearby Arab villagers. Selective protection as 
Combined GoS &
Janjaweed Attacks 
Ethnic Protection
Settlement-Level Racial Intent
Individual-Level Racial
Intent
Mass Atrocities in
Darfur 
 figure 8.3.  Combined roles of GoS and Janjaweed with ethnic protection in racial target-
ing of ethnic cleansing and mass atrocities in Darfur. 
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well as predation can be an instrumental way of separating “us” from “them” in an 
organizational dynamic of ethnic cleansing that results in mass atrocities. 
 We summarize the most important aspects of this analysis in two maps. We begin 
with the distribution of the racial epithets heard during attacks by the ADS respon-
dents. First, we consider how racial epithets were distributed in terms of the charac-
teristics of the  individuals who heard them – that is, we answer the question:  Who 
heard these epithets most often? Second, we consider how the reporting of these 
epithets varies across the  settlements – that is, we answer the question:  Where were 
these epithets heard most often? 
 At the individual level, men reported hearing racial epithets more often than wom-
en. 111 This is probably because women are less likely than men to know the Arabic 
words of the shouted epithets. Respondents also indicated they heard racial epithets 
less often in settlements with rebels. 112 This ! nding is strongly suggestive that the 
scorched-earth tactics of the attacks focused on civilians rather than on suspected 
rebels. Three of the four African groups – the Fur, Masalit, and Jebal – more often 
reported hearing racial epithets than did the Zaghawa. 113 This is likely because the 
Zaghawa were more often victims of bombing and air attacks than other groups – 
there is more opportunity to hear the epithets during ground attacks. 114 Epithets were 
reported less often during the ! rst wave of attacks than at other times, 115 which sug-
gests that the racialization of the attacks increased over the duration of the con" ict. 
 Map 8.1 portrays the variation in reported racial epithets across the settlements. It 
indicates variation in the proportion of respondents reporting epithets with circles of 
increasing sizes (calibrated in quartiles) in the settlements. About half of the respon-
dents in the top quartile heard racial epithets during the attacks. Thus, 45 percent of 
the respondents heard racial epithets in Kabkabiyah, where the militia leader Musa 
Hilal began his early attacks, and between 43 percent and 50 percent of respondents 
heard these epithets in settlements in southwestern Darfur – in Al Geneina, Masteri, 
Habilah, Garsila, Foro Burunga, and Benesi – the sites of attacks reported in the 
media as led by three other Janjaweed militia leaders. 116 The latter sites are in the 
more fertile and densely settled areas of Darfur. 117 
 Map 8.2 outlines the locations where news media and human rights groups 
reported attacks occurred that were led by four militia leaders – Musa Hilal, Hamid 
Dawai, Ali Kushayb, and Abdullah Shineibat. The approximate areas of their opera-
tions indicated in these independent reports are designated with triangular-shaped 
markings on  Map 8.2 . These are also the areas with high reports of racial epithets 
and attacks in  Map 8.1 . 
 111   Hagan & Rymond-Richmond ,  supra note 69, at 178. 
 112   Id . 
 113   Id . 
 114   Id . 
 115   Hagan & Rymond-Richmond ,  supra note 69, at 178. 
 116   Id . 
 117   Id . 
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 Our analysis further revealed that the racial epithets we have emphasized as indi-
cating racial intent were heard most often when the Sudanese government forces 
were joined with the Janjaweed in attacks and in areas of high settlement density. 
This ! nding, which re" ects the effects of State military organization and policy as 
well as the opportunities and incentives of land-based resources that often motivate 
ethnic cleansing, is summarized with a bar graph in  Figure 8.4 . It indicates the fol-
lowing: When Sudanese and Janjaweed forces attack together, increased population 
density notably increases the hearing of racial epithets. When the Sudanese and 
Janjaweed forces attack separately, increased population density slightly diminishes 
the hearing of these epithets. Recall that the Sudanese and Janjaweed forces operate 
together in about two-thirds of the attacks. 118 The effect of this  combination of forces 
 118   Id . at 179. 
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 map 8.2.  Janjaweed militia leaders’ areas of operation. 
9780521116480c08_p177-201.indd   198 12/7/2010   10:38:49 AM
Ethnic Cleansing 199
in the right side of  Figure 8.4 – in areas representing higher population densities – is 
to approximately  double the hearing of racial epithets from about 20 percent to more 
than 40 percent. This is compelling evidence of the organized policy role of the 
Sudanese State in intensifying the expression of racial intent by joining its military 
forces with the Janjaweed in attacks on densely settled areas of Darfur. 
 We next observe the impact of what we have called collective racial intent in two 
ways.  Map 8.1 provided the ! rst re" ection of our ! nding of a signi! cant effect of col-
lective racial intent. The map showed that racial epithets were heard more often in 
the Kabkabiyah area, where the militia leader Musa Hilal launched his attacks, and 
in the southwestern settlements in West Darfur, where three other leaders had been 
active. Inside the circles on  Map 8.1 , which re" ect these elevated reports of racial 
epithets, we also present the quartile ranks of the severity of total victimization, as 
operationalized earlier, as well as sexual victimization that we measured separately 
as the number of sexual assaults reported as occurring during the attacks. 119 
 There is a clear tendency in  Map 8.1 for the quartile ranking of victimization 
scores across settlements to coincide with the quartile ranking of reported racial epi-
thets. Thus, top quartile victimization scores are found in ! ve of the six settlements 
that also feature elevated racial epithets in the southwestern part of West Darfur. 
This part of West Darfur is more fertile and densely settled. The statistical models 
we present elsewhere show that these are also the areas where victimization is most 
 119   See also John Hagan, Wenona Rymond-Richmond & Alberto Palloni,  Racial Targeting of Sexual 
Violence in Darfur , 99  Am. J. Pub. Health 1386  (2009). 
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severe, and that this pattern is further mediated by the pervasiveness of the racial 
epithets and their collective effect in increasing victimization. 120 This part of the 
analysis supports Diamond’s metaphor, introduced earlier, that his expectation that 
collective racial intent is the transformative racial spark that ignites the powder keg 
of settlement density. 121 
 There is also a pattern in  Map 8.1 of higher-level victimization scores and racial 
epithet reports extending from Kabkabiyah, through Adar, and northward to Kornei. 
This pattern of scores re" ects the northern line of attacks that Musa Hilal threat-
ened in remarks reported in the market town of Kabkabiyh, as described in ADS 
survey interviews. 122 It seems likely that if the levels of settlement density were as 
high in North Darfur as they are in the affected areas of West Darfur, that the pattern 
observed in this part of the map would be even more striking. 
 An important ! nal ! nding about collective racial intent and bombing is summa-
rized in  Figure 8.5 . This ! gure indicates that at lower levels of collective racial intent, 
the effect of increased bombing is associated with decreasing levels of victimization, 
whereas at higher levels of collective racial intent, the effect of increased bombing is 
to elevate total victimization. 123 The basic thesis underwriting our analysis is that the 
Sudanese government enlisted the Janjaweed militias and channeled their hostility 
toward black African groups as a means of more effectively gaining control over the 
Darfur region – out of fear that this region was escaping government control. Given 
 120   Hagan & Rymond-Richmond ,  supra note 69, at 177–82. 
 121   Diamond ,  supra note 101, at 326. 
 122   Hagan & Rymond-Richmond ,  supra note 69, at 181. 
 123   Id . 
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that the bombing by GoS planes is entirely under Sudanese State control, the com-
bined use of the Janjaweed militias and government bombing is particularly strik-
ing evidence of the use of State power to divide and victimize subordinate groups. 
 Figure 8.5 supplements the earlier ! ndings in showing how, especially in densely 
settled areas, the concentration of bombing and collective racial hostility against 
African groups, such as the Fur and Masalit, produces elevated levels of victimiza-
tion. The Sudanese government directed the bombing and enlisted the Janjaweed 
in racially animated attacks that intensi! ed victimization. This is evidence that a 
joined, collective intent was enacted and accomplished. 
 VII.  CONCLUSIONS 
 We propose the acceptance of a de! nition of ethnic cleansing, such as Petrović’s, 
which emphasizes the enactment of an explicit policy of elimination or removal by 
one group against another that is de! ned in religious, ethnic, national, or racial terms 
and is organized in relation to an identi! ed geographic area by military or socio-
political means ranging from discrimination to extermination. Scienti! c research, 
legal scholarship, and judicial decision making can all play a role in further identify-
ing the more exact boundaries of ethnic cleansing. More speci! cally, we argue that 
establishing the occurrence of ethnic cleansing may characteristically involve a mix-
ture of social scienti! c criminological and legal evidence, with the criminological 
evidence playing a leading role. The challenge is to fully delineate the boundaries 
of ethnic cleansing in relation to genocide. Scheffer’s distinction between atrocity 
crime and atrocity law creates a space in which this kind of documentation and 
analysis may occur. We have considered how this kind of documentation and analy-
sis was undertaken in Kosovo and Darfur. These are only examples. Unfortunately, 
there is no shortage of other settings in which this work may be furthered. 
 
9780521116480c08_p177-201.indd   201 12/7/2010   10:38:50 AM
